I conduct an analysis of the possible determinants of sovereign credit ratings assigned by the two leading credit rating agencies, Moody's and Standard and Poor's, by using both a linear and a logistic transformation of the rating scales. Of the large number of variables that can be used, the set of explanatory variables selected in this study is significant in explaining the credit ratings. Namely, six variables appear to be the most relevant to determine a country's credit rating: GDP per capita, external debt, level of economic development, default history, real growth rate and inflation rate.
-Introduction
The relevance of rating the creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers arises from the fact that national governments are by far the largest issuers on capital markets and also because those country ratings are seen as a ceiling to public and private sector issues. The financial literature devoted to modelling sovereign credit rating is rather sparse. Nevertheless, some examples of this line of research are Cosset and Roy (1991) , Moon and Stotsky (1993) , Lee (1993) , Cantor and Packer (1997) and Larrain, Helmut and Maltzan (1997) .
This paper studies the factors that seem to play an important role in determining sovereign debt rating. For that purpose, I collected information concerning several quantitative and qualitative variables for a universe of 81 developed and developing countries, and also the ratings assigned to those countries by Standard & Poor's and Moody's in June 2001 . With this sectional sample an attempt is made to replicate the effective ratings given by those two agencies. This is done using both a linear and a logistic transformation of the rating levels.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. The next section describes briefly the more commonly used rating notation systems for sovereign public debt; the rating model estimated in this paper is discussed in section three; the results are reported in section four and section five contains a summary and conclusions.
Bonds, which are rated A, possess many favourable investment attributes and are to be considered as upper-medium-grade obligations. Factors giving security to principal and interest are considered adequate, but elements may be present which suggest a susceptibility to impairment some time in the future.
A-A3 BBB+ Baa1
BBB Baa2
Bonds, which are rated Baa, are considered as medium-grade obligations (i.e., they are neither highly protected nor poorly secured In this study, I used the rating classifications of S&P and Moody's, in June 2001, for a sample consisting of 81 countries. In this country sample, there are 29 developed countries and 52 developing countries. 3 The rating classifications for external government debt, for each country, are presented in Table 2 . Only countries with rating notation between AAA (Aaa) and B-(B3) were selected, in order to avoid lower quality bonds, eventually with more speculative characteristics.
One should notice that this sample has around 29 per cent of countries with rating classification equal or above AA (using for instance the S&P notation), and that 56 per cent of the selected countries had an assigned rating below the A-notch, as one may confirm by Table 3 . Also, there are around 35-37 per cent of countries whose rating falls below the investment grade cut off (starting at BB+ or Ba1). Obviously, some transformation between qualitative information and cardinal variables is always needed before doing some empirical estimation. 4 In order to get appropriate data to implement empirical estimations, it is necessary to perform a numerical transformation of the rating notches into numbers. Therefore, one may construct a variable RATING that takes numeric values between 1 and 16, defined according to the notation levels of the two rating agencies, using a linear transformation. For instance, to the rating level B-(B3), corresponds the value 1 for the variable RATING, to the rating level AAA (Aaa), corresponds the maximum value of 16 for the variable RATING. The correspondence between the rating levels and the values given to the RATING variable is presented in Table 4 . According to the qualitative notations and the cardinal transformation reported, one may notice a few points. All the EU-15 countries had at the time (June 2001) a rating level of at least A (A2), which was the notation attributed to Greece, with most of the countries with ratings between AAA (Aaa) or AA (Aa). Also, and considering the classification of developed countries used by the IMF, all these countries have a rating level equal to or above A. In other words, the rating level appears clearly correlated with the development of the country.
Another point to mention is that the rating levels given by the two agencies are quite similar. In fact, the difference between the two classifications is never higher than 2 points, according to the cardinal classification used in this paper, except for the following countries: Barbados, China, Kuwait, Taiwan and Turkey. For the entire country sample, one may also see that Moody's gives a better rating than S&P to only 11 countries, and that S&P assigns better ratings to only 17 countries. In terms of the cardinal classification used in this paper, this means, for this country sample, an accumulated difference of 13 and 21 points respectively for Moody's and for S&P.
These differences suggest probably both the use of different explanatory factors and different weights by each agency in their rating methodologies. There could be also some attempt by the agencies to gain market share, by giving some countries a notch more than the competitors. Additionally, for the EU-15 countries, the notations of the two agencies are basically the same, except for a difference of one point in four countries. Moody's assigns to 5 For instance, with data for 252 US municipal government debt, Moon and Stotsky (1992) mention that there was some tendency for S&P to give a better rating than Moody's.
Ireland and Finland a better rating than the one proposed by S&P, while S&P gives Italy and Spain better ratings than Moody's does. Even if "split rating" at a letter grade commonly occurs, this may give conflicting information to potential investors.
-Rating determinants
To assess the credit risk of governments is not an easy task. One must take into account both solvency facts and aspects such as the stability of the political system, social cohesion and the degree of interdependence with international economic and financial systems. 6 It is also worthwhile noticing that sovereigns, unlike corporate issuers, are less likely to face claims from creditors if the circumstance of a default arises. This is true even if governments have an incentive to make payments, resulting from the possibility of capital market autarky.
Among the factors that might influence the attribution of a higher or lower rating level to each sovereign issuance, one may mention for instance the political stability of the country, the level of external debt, the evidence on previous issuances and eventual defaults, information about the public accounts, indicators of economic performance and the degree of the country development.
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After a first analysis, where was assessed the correlation of several variables with the cardinal variable RATING, and the plausibility of the economic relations, the following variables were selected: per capita GDP; inflation rate; GDP real growth rate; development indicator; default indicator; external debt-exports ratio (this variable is only relevant for developing countries); government deficit as a percentage of GDP. Variables such as the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP, central government spending as a percentage of GDP or the debt-to-GDP ratio, turned out to be poorly correlated with the rating classifications. 6 See for instance Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and also Bulow (1992) for the differences between corporate and sovereign default. 7 The rationale for several of these factors is discussed namely by Edwards (1984) , Haque et al. (1996) , Cantor and Packer (1996) while Haque, Mark and Mathieson (1998) assess the importance of political factors. One may also see for instance the criteria definition used by Moody's (2001) . 8 Nevertheless, both the current account deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio were used in the estimations but with no significant result.
In what follows, some theoretical and intuitive explanations are given about the contribution of the aforementioned set of explanatory variables, to the determination of sovereign debt ratings.
GDP per capita is supposedly a measure of the country development and can be seen as an indicator of the tax basis available in the economy. Also, countries high lower GDP per capita may be less able to solve debt service problems by implementing austerity measures. Therefore, the bigger GDP per capita the more likely is the attribution of a higher rating level.
Inflation rate has two opposite effects on the existing stock of government debt. In one hand, an increase of inflation improves the public debt dynamics by reducing the real value of government debt, in the other hand a rise in inflation contributes negatively to the debt dynamics because it makes it necessary for the government to pay higher nominal interest rates.
Also, high inflation may signal excess demand or labour market distortions.
Additionally it may also imply some lack of capacity for a country to finance its public expenditures using only public revenues and issuing public debt. Economic history has already several episodes were countries resorted to printing money in order to meet their borrowing requirements. One should therefore expect to see a negative relation between the level of the rating and inflation rate.
Economy real growth allows, on its own, ceteris paribus, for a relative decrease of the country indebtedness, making it easier to face future debt service related payments, decreasing also the cyclical component of the primary budget balance. 9 Besides this, a growing economy is more likely to absorb excess labour supply, to decrease unemployment, increase living standards and to downplay possible social conflicts and political instability. 10 One should therefore expect economic growth to be positively correlated with the rating levels.
The degree of development of a country is in principle already taken into account when one uses information concerning the GDP per capita. However, the analysis of the data reveals that rating agencies attribute a smaller probability of default to the countries labelled as developed. This indicator has one of the highest correlations with the rating level, around 0,85 for the country sample used in this paper, being therefore reasonable to assume a positive relation between these two variables. Indeed, highranking countries are invariably those with higher GDP per capita.
The default history of sovereigns is an extremely important factor to assess the credibility of Governments to meet their future responsibilities. Obviously, a history of partial or total defaults ends up being penalized with lower rating levels.
11 Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986, pp 482-483 ) define a default situation as follows:
"Whenever the borrower gives resources to the lender that are less than the fixed amount he is committed to pay the lender, then there is a default. A significant external debt-to-exports ratio is generally associated with a greater default risk, since the source of foreign currency, exports, may not be enough to ensure the debt payments. A country where this ratio is high is more likely to be adversely affected by changes in the terms of trade or a decrease in foreign demand.
expenditures in order to minimize public accounts unbalances. Therefore, budget surpluses should be positively correlated with higher ratings.
Additionally, the debt-to-GDP ratio turned out to be significantly uncorrelated with the rating level, and the same was true with public expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
The general model to estimate is as follows: [1998] [1999] [2000] .
According to what was said above, it seems therefore reasonable to anticipate the following signs for the coefficients of each variable in equation (1): α 1 > 0 (per capita GDP); α 2 < 0 (inflation); α 3 > 0 (GDP real growth); α 4 > 0 (developed country indicator); α 5 < 0 (external debt-to-exports ratio); α 6 < 0 (default indicator) and α 7 > 0 (budget balance).
-Estimations and results discussions
Equation (1) was estimated using OLS. An attempt was also made in order to estimate a multinomial Logit, however, the absence of a significant number of values for the dependent variable and a reduced number of sectional data, prevents the maximum likelihood convergence of the coefficients.
-Using a linear transformation
Of the several versions tried for equation (1), only the more statistically significant are presented. The estimations were carried out using the two series for the RATING variable, according to the ratings of S&P or Moody's, with the linear transformation constructed in section two. The results for the S&P data are reported on Table 5 , and allow us to conclude that all the coefficients have the expected signs. Also, most of the coefficients are indeed statistically different from zero.
Regarding the S&P notations, the best models seem to be S2 and S3 of Table 5 . The two models, vis-à-vis model S1, for instance, enhance the role of the variables that try to capture the information from the default history and from the ratio of external debt to exports. In other words, these two factors appear as highly important in determining and explaining the rating level, and are both, as expected, negatively related to sovereign credit quality. Remember also that the explanatory variable external debt-to-exports ratio is only being used for the developing countries.
The budget balance variable, as a percentage of GDP, even if it has the correct sign, is not unequivocally statistically significant, since its estimated coefficient is only different from zero at the 15 per cent level, as one may observe from the results of models S4 and S5. Concerning the estimations with the rating data for Moody's, one gets rather similar results, reported on Table 6 . Once more all the coefficients have the expected sign, and the budget balance now turns out to be statistically different from zero, at least at a level of 10 and 5 per cent, respectively in models M4 and M5. Nevertheless, the models without the budget balance variable and with GDP real growth rate seem to be statistically more adequate. It is interesting to point also to the significance of the explanatory variable DEVELOP in all models of tables 5 and 6, corroborating, as expected, the initial idea that the so-called developing countries have lower credit ratings. Inflation has also rather meaningful information to explain the rating levels, with low inflation countries getting a better notation from both agencies, in all versions of the model.
After several simulations with all the estimated models, models S3 and M2 were selected as the more suitable in replicating the ratings given by the two agencies. The estimated ratings are quite similar, with both models presenting an absolute percentage average error of around 30 per cent. Table 7 reports the predicted errors from model S3 for 71 countries of the initial sample. With this model, the maximum prevision error is 4 notches, and this occurs only for 3 countries: Chile, Pakistan and Paraguay. For Chile the model underpredicts the rating and for the other two countries it delivers an over-prediction of the rating level. For the developed countries, one can also notice that the absolute prediction error is always equal to or below 2 notches. Also, the absolute prediction errors obtained from this model do not go beyond 1 notch for 42 of the 71 countries.
For the EU-12 countries one may also mention some results. The maximum absolute error is 2 notches, with zero error for 4 countries: Belgium, Finland, Italy and Luxemburg. The model assigns a better rating to only two countries: Ireland (1 notch more) and Greece (2 notches more). Also, the model suggests a lower rating for the 6 remaining countries of the EU-12: France, Netherlands and Portugal (minus 1 notch), Austria, Germany and Spain (minus 2 notches). Also, and considering now two EU-12 countries with similar a GDP per capita, Portugal and Greece (11780 US dollars), it is possible to see that the model assigns them, in round figures, the same rating, while the effective ratings are set apart by 3 notches, with Greece having the lower rating. In this case, the circumstance that Greece did not make it to euro group from the start may have affected negatively the rating of its sovereign debt. GDP per capita is rather influential in the estimated models. Nevertheless, notice for instance that the S3 model predicts 2 notches below the effective rating level for Austria and Germany, two countries with similar GDP per capita, respectively 23142 and 24091 dollars. Also, there is a prediction of only 1 notch below the effective rating for France and Netherlands, countries where the GDP per capita is respectively 26919 and 27851 dollars. GDP real growth rate must be playing here an important role since the average real growth rate, between 1998 and 2000, was 3,2 per cent in France and only 2,2 per cent in Germany.
Concerning the models estimated using Moody's data, the prediction errors from model M4 are reported on Table 8 . The differences between this model (Moody's data) and model S3 (S&P data), besides the rating data, is that model M4 uses the default variable instead of the external debt-to-exports ratio and introduces also the budget balance as a regressor.
The results are similar to the ones already reported for model S3, even with the same absolute percentage average error of around 30 per cent, even if the maximum prediction error is now 5 notches (for Bulgaria). Furthermore, only for three countries is the prediction error equal to 4 notches: Hong Kong and Paraguay.
Considering the biggest prediction errors from both models (S3 and M4), the set of countries that pop up includes Chile, Pakistan, Paraguay, Bulgaria and Hong Kong. If the first four countries have low credit ratings, and probably the estimated models aren't performing that well at the low end of the rating scale, the differences in the case of Hong Kong, with both models assigning a better rating than the effective one, there may be other determinants not considered in the models. For instance, one may recall that on July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the People's Republic of China and became a Special Administrative Region of China.
Concerning now the estimated ratings for the EU-12 countries, there are only minor changes from the results of the previous model. The prediction error is null for 4 countries: Denmark, Finland, Italy and Luxembourg. This model assigns a higher rating than the effective rating to the same two countries: Ireland and Greece (plus 1 notch). Also a lower rating is estimated for 6 countries: Belgium, Netherlands and Spain (minus 1 notch), Austria, France, Germany and Portugal (minus 2 notches). Additionally I constructed the RATING variable as the arithmetic average of the ratings assigned by the two agencies, still using the linear transformation. Since the estimation results using the rating data in such a way are not substantially different from the ones already reported, these results are not presented in the text.
-Using a logistic transformation
The models estimated so far, based on a linear transformation of the rating levels, show some lack of accuracy for the countries located on the top end of the rating scale. Another approach was therefore attempted, by using a logistic transformation of the ratings, instead of the usual linear transformation.
The idea underlying the use of the logistic transformation is that at the bottom of the scale, and since the rating level is low, ratings can rise rather quickly, as the sovereigns deliver some improvements. At the top end of the rating scale however, the increase of an additional notch is slower, since the requisites of sovereign quality are now more demanding.
If one assumes that the functional form that describes the relationship between the creditworthiness rating, R i , normalized to grade each of the countries on a scale of zero to one with zero representing the least creditworthy countries and one representing the most creditworthy countries, and the set of explanatory variables, X (the same exogenous variables used in (1)), is the standard conventional logistic form
where the vector β´ includes the parameters of the exogenous variables. The logistic
where L i is the logit of R i . This equation is not only linear in X, but also linear in the parameters and can be estimated using ordinary least squares. The estimation results of equation (3), using the logistic transformation, for the S&P ratings are reported on Table 9 . All the estimated coefficients have again the expected sign. The results in terms of the prediction errors from model S7 (logistic) are reported in Table 10 , and are not very different from the errors produced by model S3 (linear). points (see Table 7 and Table 11 ). Figure 4 supplements the previous analysis by depicting the aforementioned prediction differences for model S7. The estimation results using both the logistic transformation and data from Moody's, are presented on Table 11 . The logistic transformation applied to the Moody's data gives as a maximum prediction error of 5 notches for one country, Hong Kong, and of 4 notches for another single country, Lebanon. All other countries get estimated ratings equal or below 3 points. Once again, the use of the logistic transformation improves the overall adjustment of the model. This is true since the absolute percentage average error for model M7 (logistic) is around 25 per cent, better than the absolute percentage average error of 30 per cent that was associated with model M4 (linear). Table 12 reports the prediction errors for each country, with model M7 of Table 11 . Rating (Moody's) Doing again the comparison between the prediction errors of models M4 (linear) and M7 (logistic), for instance for the EU-15 countries, it is possible to say that the logistic transformation appears to perform better than the linear transformation.
Indeed, the cumulative prediction errors of 15 points from model M4 are now reduced to 11 points with model M7. Therefore, using both rating notations, from S&P and from Moody's, one gets better adjustments with a logistic transformation of the qualitative data. This implies the absence of a linear transition from one notch to the next, along the rating scale.
-Conclusion
This study tried to understand the determinants of sovereign credit rating, using data for the two major agencies: Moody's and S&P. The variables that seem to have statistically significant explanatory power for the rating levels are: GDP per capita, external debt as a percentage of exports, the level of economic development, default history, real growth rate and the inflation rate. The GDP per capita is a rather important variable when estimating the appropriate rating level both for developed and developing countries. The external debt variable is basically relevant for Of the several fiscal variables tested, only the budget balance was moderately relevant in explaining the rating level. Future analysis could take into consideration several components of public expenditures and revenues. In fact, when facing fiscal episodes, the assessment of its success in balancing public accounts may hinge on the composition of the episode. 15 Also, taking into account implicit public pension liabilities, as part of the country global fiscal unbalance, might be perceived by capital markets as future borrowing requirements, not fully embedded in the public fiscal figures, leading therefore to added country risk. 16 Still another additional improvement for the models would be to consider the political risk of each sovereign.
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Finally, if one collects data on the changes of the rating levels for each country, throughout a series of years, one can pursue another approach by assessing the factors that help explain the upgrade or the downgrade of the rating notations. This is a line 14 See Haque et al. (1996) and Cantor and Packer (1996) . 15 On these topics see for instance Kneller et al. (1999) and Afonso (2001) . 16 Holzmann et al. (2001) report and review some data on this issue. 17 Haque et al. (1998) mention nevertheless that the introduction of political variables, as explanatory factors of the rating levels, does not give much additional information over models where those variables are not included.
